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 1 
 The Rise and Fall of Social Cohesion 
 This book is about how social cohesion can be established and demolished. 
The US and UK, where social cohesion declined in the latter part of the 20th 
century, and Sweden and Denmark, where social cohesion increased in the 
latter part of the 20th century, will serve as examples of this. This book defi nes 
social cohesion as the belief—held by citizens in a given nation state—that 
they share a moral community, which enables them to trust each other. Thus, 
more concretely, this book will try to answer why Americans and Britons less-
ened their trust in each other, while Swedes and Danes developed more trust 
in the citizens of their countries. 
 This book argues that trust decreased in the US and UK because many 
Americans and Britons came to believe that most fellow citizens belong to 
‘the bottom’ rather than ‘the middle’ of society. Following the same line of 
reasoning, this book argues that trust increased in Sweden and Denmark 
because many Swedes and Danes came to believe that most fellow citizens 
belonged to ‘the middle’ and not to a distinguished ‘bottom’ or ‘top’ of soci-
ety. Furthermore, it is not only the very size of ‘the middle’, ‘the bottom’, and 
‘the top’ that matters. It is also the perception of the character of— especially—
those at the bottom of a society that matters. This book argues that many 
Britons and Americans came to consider the (perceived) sizeable bottom of 
society as untrustworthy, undeserving, and even dangerous, while many 
Swedes and Danes came to consider the (perceived) small group of citizens left 
at the bottom of their societies as trustworthy, deserving, and peaceful. Why 
those in the middle of society are thought trustworthy, and why those at the 
bottom of society are not, is theorized in Chapter 4. 
 From the very fi rst lines of this book, the observant reader will have noticed 
that this book emphasizes the importance of perceptions and misperceptions. 
Thus this book provides a social constructivist perspective on trust. Trust and 
distrust towards fellow citizens are understood as judgments depending on 
citizens’ perceptions of the society in which they live. This is not to say that 
the ‘real’ society does not matter for the citizens’ perception of society; a 
01_Larsen_Ch01.indd   3 5/25/2013   2:34:02 AM
Introduction
4
large part of this book will look at the socio-economic conditions behind the 
changed perceptions of society (Chapters 2 and 3). There is indeed a kernel 
of truth in the belief that the middle of society has decreased and the bot-
tom of society increased in the US and UK. There is also a kernel of truth in 
the belief that the middle of society has increased and the bottom of society 
decreased in Sweden and Denmark. But the main contribution of this book is 
to demonstrate the interplay between the real socio-economic changes and 
the changes in public perceptions of fellow citizens. The premise is that one 
cannot expect a one-to-one relationship between real fellow citizens (if one 
manages to uncover them) and ‘imagined’ fellow citizens. Many things inter-
cede between reality and the perception of reality, such as the human inabil-
ity to understand the world in its complexity, the human tendency to build 
identity based on in-group/out-group mechanisms, the limited interaction 
between citizens within a large ‘imagined community’ as a nation state, the 
simplifi cations (and sometimes distortions) made by mass media and politi-
cal elites, and others. Therefore this book has taken human perceptions of 
reality as the starting point for explaining changes in citizens’ beliefs in the 
trustworthiness of fellow citizens. 
 That citizens’ perceptions of reality have real consequences for the func-
tioning of society is another premise of this book. This point is nicely stated 
in the ‘Thomas theorem’: ‘If men defi ne situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences ’ (W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas 1928: 571–2). In terms 
of trust there are indeed good reasons to believe that whether citizens fi nd 
fellow citizens trustworthy or not has real consequences for the functioning 
of highly differentiated postmodern societies. The perception of the trustwor-
thiness of fellow citizens might infl uence how we behave in civil society, in 
markets, and in the political system. This book will elaborate especially on 
the latter—how large majorities’ perceptions of society through voting have 
a real impact on socio-economic conditions within given countries. Later in 
this book it is argued that negative public perceptions of those at the bot-
tom of society help explain why American and British politicians do little 
to combat social erosion and sometimes even seem to facilitate the process. 
Following the same logic, it will also be shown that positive public perception 
of those at the bottom of society helps explain why even right-wing Swedish 
and Danish governments have been forced to combat the mechanisms which 
lead to poverty and economic inequality. By unraveling these mechanisms, 
I reach the pessimistic conclusion that the US and UK were (and are) caught 
in a vicious circle which made (and makes) it politically diffi cult to com-
bat the mechanisms that lead to social erosion, and the optimistic conclu-
sion that Sweden and Denmark are caught in a ‘virtuous circle’ which made 
(and makes) it politically diffi cult not to combat the mechanisms that lead 
to social erosion. 
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 Finally, this book argues that increased ethnic heterogeneity is the largest 
contemporary challenge to social cohesion in Sweden and Denmark. The big 
question is whether the increased social cohesion experienced in Sweden and 
Denmark was only possible in rather ethnic homogeneous nation states. This 
book supports the thesis that this may be so. The problem is that low-skilled 
immigrants from countries (believed to be) culturally distinct can easily come 
to be seen as an untrustworthy, undeserving, and dangerous new ‘bottom’ of 
society. Thereby, Sweden and Denmark are currently exposed to some of the 
mechanisms which led to the erosion of social cohesion in the US and UK. 
However, it follows—from my arguments to come—that the impact of such 
‘external shocks’ on social cohesion is contingent on institutions and politi-
cal power structures which historically have worked in favor of increased 
social cohesion in Sweden and Denmark. Therefore, this book predicts that 
despite the fact that the US and UK have much more historical experience 
with fi ghting negative ethnic stereotypes, Sweden and Denmark are the most 
likely to be successful in combatting negative ethnic stereotyping. This will 
be a cornerstone for establishing social cohesion in the nation states of the 
21st century. 
 In this fi rst chapter, this book’s topic is brought into relation with the dom-
inant public debate about social cohesion (section 1.1), and to both the his-
torical and current academic debates on the importance of trust  (section 1.2). 
The third section substantiates that trust levels have decreased in the US and 
UK and increased in Sweden and Denmark (section 1.3). The theoretical ambi-
tion of this book is discussed in the fourth section (section 1.4). The argument 
here is that the trust literature has done a lot to explain stability but very little 
to explain change. Therefore change in trust levels is still an academic puzzle. 
In the fi fth section (section 1.5), I explain why a comparison between the US, 
UK, Sweden, and Denmark provides a key to understanding how social cohe-
sion is established and demolished. One obvious reason is that one fi nds a 
profound change in trust levels in these four countries. However, historically 
these four countries also have a lot in common, which makes them a suitable 
choice for comparison. Finally, the chapter briefl y introduces the unique data 
material upon which this book is based (section 1.6) and outlines the overall 
structure of this book and its main line of reasoning (section 1.7). 
 1.1  The debate over social cohesion 
 We live in a time when citizens, policymakers, and even social scientists in 
some of the most affl uent nation states have the feeling that their societies are 
falling apart. This feeling of falling apart can be given many different names 
dependent on one’s basic values, interests, and favored policy solutions, 
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but the term ‘social cohesion’ seems to be central in the discussion. As most 
other terms that successfully capture a broad societal feeling, it is undefi ned, 
unclear, and positively loaded. Often ordinary citizens, policymakers, and 
social scientists just refer to the ‘glue’ or the ‘bonds’ that keep societies (in this 
context advanced Western nation states) integrated. However for academic 
purposes it is important to be more specifi c about what is actually meant 
by the terms we use. As already mentioned, I suggest that we defi ne social 
cohesion as the belief held by citizens of a given nation state that they share 
a moral community, which enables them to trust each other. This defi nition 
brings us a bit closer to a common understanding. But despite the focus on 
social cohesion, it is actually the absence of social cohesion that is central to 
the discussion. The very discussion of social cohesion implies its absence and, 
even more specifi cally, the decline of social cohesion. I suggest that we label 
the decline of social cohesion ‘social erosion’, which we then can defi ne as 
fewer citizens in a given nation state having the belief that they share a moral 
community that enables them to trust each other. Thus, a precondition for 
social erosion is that citizens in a given nation state previously believed that 
they shared a moral community. This idea of losing a moral community that 
previously kept society integrated is central in current (as well as previous) 
public debates. 
 The diagnosis of social erosion has been strongly emphasized in the US 
and is supported by the work of American social scientists. As social scientists 
we can start to measure the moral standards citizens hold, see whether they 
are good for society, measure whether there is a consensus about them (the 
good ones), and see whether they have declined over time. Such a task was 
undertaken for example by Robert Putnam, who presented the diagnosis of 
social erosion in the US in his bestselling book  Bowling Alone (2000). Charles 
Murray’s book  Losing Ground (1984) was another major contribution that sup-
ported the thesis of social erosion. The claim was that, within the leading 
Western country, the US, one could fi nd a distinct underclass culture which 
totally disregarded that society’s broader norms and values. Murray updated 
this diagnosis in the book  Coming Apart (2012), which created a new media 
fuss. The basic idea is that there is no longer only the black underclass but also 
a new white under- and upper class, which have come to dismiss the ‘good’ 
American values. To this idea we shall return. 
 The clearest example of amoral behaviour is crime. Especially when crime 
comes in the form of riots, it produces the feeling that societies are falling 
apart. The riots in Los Angeles in 1992, in which young black Americans 
demolished parts of the city (53 persons were killed and thousands injured), 
became an important symbol for the social erosion diagnosis established by 
American academics. At the time of writing, the clearest symbol of social ero-
sion in the US is the killing of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black 17-year-old 
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wearing a hoodie. He was killed by a 28-year-old ‘Neighborhood Watch’ vol-
unteer, who claimed self-defense. In his call to the 911 operator, the volunteer 
found the hoodied teenager ‘real suspicious’. Sadly, the Neighborhood Watch 
volunteer was not arrested immediately. He was only charged and prosecuted 
after intense national media attention. 
 The same diagnosis of social erosion has also been strongly emphasized in 
the UK. Hall (1999) replicated parts of Putnam’s study and confi rmed that 
social erosion was also taking place there. Murray’s diagnosis of underclass 
culture was also brought into the UK context and fuelled a wide discussion 
(Dean and Taylor-Gooby 1992). However, for the public debate, the most 
important factor is the incidence of rioting. At the time of writing it is the 
riots in August 2011 in London and other large British cities which shake 
British perceptions of a shared moral community. More than 3,000 persons 
were arrested for looting and other crimes within a week. Earlier, in 2001, the 
UK experienced riots (in the three Northern cities of Burnley, Oldham, and 
Bradford) which also attained high symbolic value. Therefore it is no wonder 
that the American diagnosis of social erosion has resonated in the British 
context. It is telling that the British Prime Minister David Cameron won that 
offi ce by campaigning on the slogan of the ‘broken society’ (2010). 
 It seems to be a shared concern among Western policymakers, social sci-
entists, and even ordinary citizens that social cohesion has been threatened. 
One of the reasons is that what happens in the US and UK has a strong infl u-
ence on the thinking of society in other Western countries. This is partly 
because these two countries have symbolic value; they were once the leaders 
of the ‘advanced’ Western countries. But most importantly this is due to the 
fact that the English language has been globalized. Policymakers, social sci-
entists, and even ordinary citizens are able to absorb the ideas developed in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries, including the idea of social erosion. The French 
(which consistently resist the absorption of Anglo-Saxon ideas) have also 
developed a diagnosis of social erosion. Again, riots took on high symbolic 
value. In 2005, France experienced severe riots in which for a month, young-
sters, from poor neighborhoods and primarily of Muslim background, burned 
cars in the suburbs of major towns. Around 9,000 cars were burned and 3,000 
persons arrested. And even Scandinavians can come up with terrible stories. 
In 2011 an extremist , Anders Breivik, killed 77 Norwegians, most teenagers, 
in order to promote his anti-immigrant attitudes. Another extremist  shot at 
immigrants in the Swedish city Malmoe during 2009 and 2010. However, for 
the public interpretation it makes a big difference whether the crimes were 
committed by large groups, as in riots, or just a single extremist . 
 If social cohesion is threatened, the next question is naturally what or 
who is to be blamed. This is a complicated issue which will be discussed 
throughout this book. However, in the European context, it is currently the 
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continent’s non-Western immigrants who seem to be blamed. Thus leading 
politicians argue that social cohesion can be restored by abandoning pre-
vious multiculturalist policies. The British Prime Minister David Cameron 
argued in 2011 that ‘under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have 
encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other 
and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to 
which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated 
communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values’ (5 
February 2011). Five days later the French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared 
that multiculturalism had failed in France and argued that ‘of course we must 
all respect differences, but we do not want . . . a society where communities 
coexist side by side. . . . If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single 
community, which is the national community, and if you do not want to 
accept that, you cannot be welcome in France’ (10 February 2011, cited by 
AFP). A half-year earlier (October 2010) the German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
had also proclaimed that multiculturalism had ‘failed totally’ in Germany. In 
Denmark and Norway the anti-immigrant parties have gained infl uence and 
recently so has the Swedish counterpart (5.7 per cent of the votes in the 2010 
election). 
 Nevertheless, this could have been a story about social erosion in the US 
and UK and not a story about general social erosion in Western societies. 
This book will illustrate this point by comparing the US and UK with Sweden 
and Denmark. The latter two countries have been exposed to many of the 
same societal forces that are believed to have caused social erosion in the 
US and UK. To start with, both Sweden and Denmark are strongly exposed 
to the general forces of individualization, urbanization, and economic glo-
balization. More specifi cally, both Sweden and Denmark have also been 
de-industrialized, they have experienced a break-up of family structures, 
and both countries have experienced a great infl ux of non-Western immi-
grants (see Chapter 2). But in contrast to the US and UK, neither Sweden 
nor Denmark seems to have experienced any decline in the public per-
ception of social cohesion. The examples of social erosion, some of them 
mentioned above, are more spectacular and therefore easier to remember 
than those that demonstrate social cohesion. However, when I ask elderly 
Danes whether social cohesion has decreased, they do not give an affi rma-
tive answer. Normally, they state that the bonds of society have defi nitely 
changed but not weakened. Measured in survey studies on the best indicator 
of social cohesion (see section 1.3 ), both Sweden and Denmark have expe-
rienced an increase in social cohesion over the last three decades. Thus the 
empirical puzzle of this book is why social trust declines in some advanced 
Western countries and increases in others. 
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 To answer this question, one needs to go back in time. The main thesis 
of this book is that the answer is to be found in the way these countries 
responded to external shocks that could potentially threaten the public’s per-
ceptions of living in a meritocratic middle-class society. Above all the response 
to de-industrialization is believed to be of great importance. In line with pre-
vious comparative welfare state research, it will be argued that after the eco-
nomic crises of the 1970s, the US and UK entered a neo-liberal, post-industrial 
path that created a poor and deprived underclass (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
1996), the existence of which came to threaten people’s perception of living 
in a middle-class society. By contrast, Denmark and Sweden entered a social 
democratic post-industrial cycle that prevented the emergence of a poor and 
deprived underclass (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996), ensuring thereby the 
public’s perception of living in a meritocratic middle-class society. Thus the 
basic causal argument is that increases and decreases in (perceptions of) social 
cohesion are to be explained by a complex interaction between basic changes 
in the production structures (for other important socio-economic variables, 
see Chapter 2) and socially constructed perceptions of society. 
 The aim of this book is to qualify the debate about social cohesion, to highlight 
the specifi c forces behind what seems to be a vicious neo-liberal post-industrial 
circle, and to show the possibility of what seems to be a social democratic ‘vir-
tuous circle’. The aim is not to present two ideal countries and promote the 
idea of social democratic policy solutions. I do not believe there was any great 
social democratic master plan behind the Swedish and Danish post-industrial 
circle; a lot happened by chance and luck. Nor am I fully convinced that social 
cohesion will not (eventually) decline in Denmark and Sweden. 
 1.2  The importance of trust in modern societies 
 The question of social cohesion is by no means a new theme. It is a clas-
sic concern within social science that the bonds that keep societies together 
might erode in the rich Western capitalist countries. One can also label them 
highly differentiated societies. This question was at the very heart of the 
new discipline of sociology in the 19th century. In Durkheim’s (1858–1917) 
terms, the question was what could replace the so-called mechanical solidar-
ity found in pre-modern societies—the solidarity that is established among 
people who are similar. This similarity could be both material: similar work, 
housing, and food; and non-material: similar beliefs, morality, and feelings. 
Durkheim labelled the non-material part of the community the  conscience col-
lective , which is the academic origin of the term ‘social cohesion’. Pre-modern 
societies were according to Durkheim characterized by a sizeable and strong 
‘collective consciousness’, which typically had a strong religious foundation, 
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so that any deviation from the moral codex was typically interpreted as a reli-
gious violation. Thus, strong norms of right and wrong and intense monitor-
ing in small communities upheld non-material similarities (Durkheim1893). 
 It was an insightful observation that this kind of solidarity based on mate-
rial and non-material similarity would come under pressure from the proc-
esses of industrialization, urbanization, and democratization that marked the 
shift from pre-modern to modern societies. Therefore many of Durkheim’s 
contemporaries were convinced that the larger differences between citizens 
in modern society would lead to much higher levels of confl ict between them. 
This is exactly the same line of reasoning that can be found in current con-
servative thinking about social cohesion, in which it is typically believed that 
societies earlier were kept integrated by good moral standards, respect for the 
family, the law, and the king (or in the modern version, the nation state)—
which standards have now been eroded. And, in order to restore harmony, 
one just needs to strengthen the old ‘collective consciousness’. This is what 
European leaders are trying to do currently. 
 However, despite sharing the worries of today’s conservative thinking, 
Durkheim rejected the idea that modern societies could be kept together by 
shared moral standards. Instead he argued that the increased interdepend-
ence found in more differentiated societies could develop into a new kind of 
‘organic solidarity’ (Durkheim 1893). The increased interdependence is easily 
spotted in the production structure. In the agrarian economy, a large number 
of citizens could be more or less self-suffi cient, while in a modern society, 
industrial or service workers are dependent on raw material delivered by oth-
ers, food produced by others, and markets where products can be exchanged. 
This could, according to Durkheim, establish an organic solidarity, the con-
sciousness in citizens of being dependent on each other (as organs in a body 
are dependent on each other). 
 The idea of organic solidarity can be questioned but at least Durkheim’s 
interdependence argument points to a very fundamental aspect of modern 
society: we all need to interact with persons we do not know. In Giddens’ terms 
it can be described as a shift from embeddedness to disembeddedness (Giddens 
1990). In such a situation, trust becomes a fundamental precondition for the 
ontological safety for the individual, as when by simply taking the bus you 
have to trust in the abilities of the experts who invented the bus, in those of the 
unknown bus driver, and those of all the other unknown drivers on the road. 
One can argue that in a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) many risks can only be over-
come by placing trust in unknown fellow citizens and the roles they fulfi l in 
the social system as policemen and women, social workers, bank advisors, and 
countless others. Even more convincing is the argument that trust in unknown 
fellow citizens, besides infl uencing individuals’ ability to cope with moder-
nity, is crucial for the functioning of modern institutions such as the market, 
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democracy, and the state (e.g. Luhmann 1979). Therefore the importance of 
trust has been so strongly emphasized in contemporary sociological thinking. 
 Horizontal trust between citizens particularly has become a major fi eld of 
interest, and not only for the discipline of sociology. In political science, trust 
between citizens is perceived to be a resource that enables societies to over-
come the basic problems of collective action (e.g. Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, 
Rothstein 2005). The problem of collective action is highlighted for example 
by the famous prisoner’s dilemma, which shows that players without mutual 
trust choose a sub-optimal solution. The most famous fi eld study is Putnam’s 
description of how democracy’s failure in South Italy and success in North Italy 
was due to different levels of social trust (1993). Trust also has a prominent place 
in economics with the basic idea that trust is a way to reduce transaction costs 
(the cost of using the market), an approach promoted by a number of leading 
economists (e.g. the 2009 Nobel Prize winner Oliver Williamson). Empirically, 
economists have also been able to show a strong correlation between trust 
between citizens and economic growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997). 
 If we return to the defi nition of social cohesion provided above—the belief 
held by citizens of a given nation state that they share a moral community—
the point is that we are now able to specify the most important aspect of the 
content of the ‘shared moral community’. For modern (or postmodern) socie-
ties, the most important aspect is not that citizens believe they share the same 
religion, family values, attitude towards homosexuality or other ideals; for the 
everyday operation of highly differentiated societies,  the most important aspect of 
social cohesion is that citizens believe they share the norm of not cheating each other . 
 In empirical analyses, horizontal trust between citizens is typically meas-
ured by the question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted—or—that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ As 
high trust levels go together with well-functioning democracies, economic 
growth, and satisfaction with living in a modern society, this item seems to 
capture what many contemporary sociologists, political scientists, and econo-
mists are looking for. Furthermore the question has the great advantage that 
it has been asked in a number of older surveys; especially its inclusion in the 
World Value Survey (WVS) is of great importance. Thus one of the most con-
vincing pieces of evidence behind the erosion thesis is that, in the US and UK, 
there is a decline in the share of people who answer that most people can be 
trusted (see section 1.3 ). Finally, I want to emphasize that the question of trust 
in ‘most people’ also has the great advantage that it does not aim to measure 
past experiences; that is, whether the respondent has previously been cheated. 
Instead, the item tries to measure what in Chapter 4 will be labelled the ‘rule of 
thumb’ used by individuals when they interact with unknown fellow citizens. 
It is exactly these socially constructed rules of thumb that are important when 
disembedded persons interact in a highly differentiated postmodern society. 
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 1.3  Trends in the horizontal trust between citizens 
 That the level of social trust has declined in the US and UK and increased in 
Sweden and Denmark can be demonstrated by means of the WVS, which has 
been conducted since the early 1980s. Fortunately we also have two ‘early’ 
survey observations from the US and UK, respectively from 1959 and 1960. 
Table 1.1 shows the respondent share answering that most people can be 
trusted. The table includes the 25 countries that conducted the fi rst wave 
of the WVS. An additional 61 countries have since joined the project and 
 conducted one or more of the later surveys (not shown). 
 Table 1.1. Share of respondents answering ‘most people can be trusted’, including 
countries that participated in fi rst World Value Survey (WVS); trend calculated as the share 
in the earliest observation minus share in the latest observation; regime classifi cation 
(S = Social democratic; L = Liberal; C = Conservative) 
 Early 
 1979/59/60 
WVS 
1981–84
WVS 
1990–93
WVS 
1994–99
WVS 
1999–04
 WVS 
 2005–08 
Trend 
(earliest—
latest)
Regime
Norway - 61 65 65 - - +4 S
Sweden - 58 66 60 66 68 +10 S
Finland 57 3 63 49 57 59 +2 S
Denmark 47 4 53 58 - 67 76 +29 S
Canada - 49 53 37 - - 12 L
Australia - 48 - 40 - 48 0 L
The 
Netherlands
- 45 54 60 45 0 C/S
N. Ireland - 44 44 40 - -4 -
UK 56 2 43 44 30 29 30 -26 L
Japan 42 42 42 43 39 -3
US 55 1 41 51 36 36 40 -15 L
Ireland - 41 47 36 - -5 -
Iceland - 40 44 - 41 +1 -
South Korea - 38 34 30 27 30 -8 -
Spain - 35 34 30 36 20 -15 C
Russia - 35 3 38 24 24 27 -8 -
Hungary - 34 25 23 22 - -12 -
Germany 
(west)
- 32 38 42 32 41 +9 C
South Africa - 31 3 28 18 12 18 -13 -
Belgium - 29 34 - 29 - 0 C
Italy - 27 36 - 33 29 +2 C
Argentina - 26 23 18 16 17 -9 -
France - 25 23 21 19 -6 C
Mexico - 18 3 34 31 22 16 -2 -
Malta 10 24 - 21 - +11
 1 1960: Putnam (2000: 140) 
 2 1959: Hall (1999: 432) 
 3 Cannot be found in the integrated fi le version 2006; cited from Svendsen and Svendsen (2006: 88) 
 4 1979: Taken from Danish Political Value survey 
Source: World Value Studies. 1981 to 2004 based on ‘integrated fi le’ version 2006; 2005–2008 based on 
‘wvs2005b/a_20081015’. ‘Don’t know’ is excluded. Data not weighted.
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 The fi rst point to make resulting from the fi gures shown is that 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 2000) ‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’ welfare 
regimes seem to share a common point of departure in a ‘golden age’. 
Within comparative welfare state research the term ‘golden age’ is used 
to describe the period from the end of the Second World War until the 
mid-1970s. In the results from the fi rst wave of WVS, the liberal and social 
democratic welfare regimes emerged with relatively high trust levels. In 
the early 1980s, 61 per cent of Norwegians, 58 per cent of Swedes, 57 per 
cent of Finns, and 53 per cent of Danes answered that most people could be 
trusted. In Denmark, we also have a national survey from 1979, where 47 per 
cent indicated trust. After these Nordic countries come Esping-Andersen’s 
liberal welfare regimes. In the early 1980s, 49 per cent in Canada, 48 per 
cent in Australia, 44 per cent in Northern Ireland, 43 per cent in Great 
Britain, 41 per cent in the USA, and 41 per cent in Ireland answered that 
most people could be trusted. Furthermore, for the US and UK it is actually 
possible to supplement the WVS with earlier observations. In 1960, 55 per 
cent of Americans, and in 1959 56 per cent of Britons, answered that most 
people could be trusted. We know now that this is a high level of trust. 
Besides Esping-Andersen’s liberal and social democratic welfare regimes, 
the WVS has measured trust levels exceeding 50 per cent in only two out of 
86 countries. 1 The ‘normal’ worldwide level is 25 to 35 per cent of respond-
ents. Thus, the previously very high level of social trust in the US and UK 
constitutes a precondition for Putnam’s and Hall’s studies of social erosion 
in the US and UK. 
 In contrast, the continental European countries, which Esping-Andersen 
calls ‘conservative’ welfare regimes, have always had—as far as we can 
 measure—low levels of social trust. From the 30 observations of conservative 
welfare regimes shown in Table 1.1, the average share answering that most 
people can be trusted is a low 32 per cent. This supports the argument that 
trust is diffi cult to establish in stratifi ed societies. Seligman (1997: 36) even 
argues that trust cannot take root in a hierarchical culture (see also Putnam 
1993: 88, 174). Among the conservative regimes, only the Netherlands has 
experienced trust levels above 50 per cent (in the second and fourth wave 
of WVS). But in terms of the structure of the welfare state, the Netherlands 
has more in common with the Nordic countries than the other continental 
European countries. Therefore Esping-Andersen describes the Netherlands as 
a hybrid type—sharing conservative and social democratic regime features. 
Thus, before we can answer why social trust has decreased in the US and UK 
and increased in Sweden and Denmark, we also need to explain why these 
 1  These are China and Indonesia (Svendsen and Svendsen 2006: 88), and the validity of this 
measure can be questioned (Lolle and Torpe 2011). 
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countries started out with high trust levels. The theoretical answer to this 
question is given in Chapter 4. 
 The second point to be made from the WVS fi gures is that, from what could 
be perceived as a common point of departure, the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon 
countries developed in distinct directions. The Nordic countries went from 
being ‘high-trust’ to ‘extremely high-trust’ countries. The Anglo-Saxon 
 countries—or at least the US and UK—went from being ‘high-trust’ to 
‘average-level-trust’ countries. 
 The WVS fi gures refl ect this social erosion in the Anglo-American countries. 
As already mentioned, 55 per cent of Americans answered in 1960 that most 
people could be trusted. This level declined to 41 per cent in the 1980s, when 
a majority answered that ‘one cannot be too careful’. The low point came in 
the mid-1990s when only 36 per cent answered that most could be trusted. 
There is a 15 percentage-point decrease if one subtracts the share answering 
that most people can be trusted in the latest wave of the WVS (40 per cent) 
from the earliest observation from the golden age (55 per cent) (see Table 1.1). 
Inglehart (1999: 95), Putnam (2000: 134), and Uslaner (2002) have all con-
fi rmed this negative American trend by means of more detailed national data. 
In Figure 1.1, the US time-trend is illustrated by means of the General Social 
Survey (GSS). Thus there is no doubt that the country that comes closest to 
Esping-Andersen’s ideal-type liberal regime actually experienced an erosion 
of horizontal trust. 
 The same decline in trust level can be found in the UK. In 1959, 56 per cent 
of British respondents answered that most people could be trusted. This level 
declined to 43 per cent and 44 per cent when measured in the early 1980s and 
early 1990s respectively, and dropped to 30 per cent when observed from the 
mid-1990s onward. As already mentioned, Peter Hall reported these fi gures 
in an infl uential 1999 article which fuelled academic debates in UK. The issue 
of whether the reported level of trust was too high in 1959 was discussed 
because Hall had excluded the category ‘depends’, which is not included in 
the WVS. Furthermore, it has been argued that the WVS may show too low a 
trust level inasmuch as respondents, prior to this question, answer questions 
about various minority groups. However, survey experiments have shown 
that these factors do not disturb the comparison over time (Sturgis, Allum, 
Patulny and Smith 2007). Thus the overall conclusion is that the decline 
in horizontal trust in Britain is not a methodological artifact. The British 
time-trend is also shown in Figure 1.1. 
 In the other liberal regimes the evidence is more scattered. The WVS also 
indicates a decline in horizontal trust in Canada from the fi rst wave (49 per 
cent) to the fourth wave (37 per cent). The same seems to be the case in 
Ireland: from 41 per cent in the fi rst wave to 36 per cent in the fourth wave. 
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Finally, the level of horizontal trust seems to be more stable in Australia and 
New Zealand. In the early 1980s, 48 per cent of Australians answered that 
most people could be trusted. This declined to 40 per cent in the third wave 
but went back up to 48 per cent in the latest wave. In New Zealand the WVS 
only provided a narrow time span. The scattered evidence from these coun-
tries (and the natural limitations of a single research project) have therefore 
limited my book to its focus on the US and UK only. 
 The WVS fi gures also refl ect the increased social cohesion in the Nordic 
countries. In these social democratic welfare regimes, the level of trust was 
already high in the early 1980s. However, in 1979, the Danish trust level – 
47 percent answered that most people could be trusted – was actually 
below the level measured  in US and UK around 1960 (see Table 1.1). But the 
striking thing is that horizontal trust continues to increase in Sweden and 
Denmark. Thus in the fi fth wave of the WVS, 76 per cent of Danes answered 
that most people could be trusted. This is a 29 percentage point increase 
from fi rst measurement in 1979 WVS and thereby Denmark has become 
the world champion in horizontal trust; a result that has been confi rmed by 
other comparative studies (e.g. G. T. Svendsen and G. L. H. Svendsen 2006). 
In the fi fth wave of the WVS, 68 per cent of Swedes answered that most 
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 Figure 1.1.  Respondent share answering ‘most people can be trusted’ in Sweden, 
Denmark, UK, and US 
 Note: The responses ‘Don’t know’ and ‘depends’ are excluded. 
 Source: UK, Sweden, and Denmark 1981–2008, World Value Surveys; UK 1959, Hall (1999:432); 
US 1960, Putnam (2000:140); US 1972–2010, General Social Survey. DK 1979: Danish political 
value survey. 
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people could be trusted, which is a 10 percentage point increase from the 
measurement in the early 1980s. In Esping-Andersen’s famous work, Sweden 
is the country closest to the ideal type of a social democratic welfare regime. 
The trends in Swedish and Danish trust levels are also plotted in Figure 1.1. 
According to WVS data, Norway and Finland also maintained very high lev-
els of horizontal trust. However, the focus in this book will be on Sweden 
and Denmark. 
 1.4  The theoretical ambition 
 Previous research on social trust has not been very successful in locating the 
mechanisms that create and destroy social cohesion. The studies that have 
focused on the extreme trust levels in the Nordic countries often empha-
size economic equality and the universal structure of the welfare programs 
(e.g. Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Larsen 2007). 
There is defi nitely something to these arguments, but they often lead to 
very static explanations such as ‘more economic equality will lead to more 
trust’. Further, the mechanisms by which economic equality actually infl u-
ences trust are often not theorized and almost never analysed. This is also 
true for the broader cross-national trust studies which typically assume lin-
ear relationships and base their inferences on cross-national differences in 
social trust (typically using multilevel regression models on cross-cut data). 
These studies succeed in describing correlations between different variables 
but often fail to understand the dynamic of change. 
 Rothstein and Uslaner (e.g. 2005) are among those who have done the 
most to theorize the very strong relationship between economic inequality 
and trust, to which we shall return in Chapter 4. In a joint article they also 
contest the assumption about linear relationships which guide much empir-
ical research. They contribute a contrasting theory about why some coun-
tries are caught in low-end equilibrium (especially developing countries) 
and why some are caught in high-end equilibrium (especially the Nordic 
countries). However despite this more sophisticated (multiple equilibrium) 
model, they basically end up with a theory that can explain stability. Thus it 
remains unclear why the Nordic countries have moved to high-end equilib-
rium and countries such as the US and UK display a move towards low-end 
equilibrium. 
 Putnam’s study of decline in American trust levels (2000) is naturally an 
important exception to the argument that most studies refrain from try-
ing to explain trends in trust levels. However the causal logic in Putnam’s 
explanation of the decline in trust in the US has been heavily criticized (e.g. 
Levi 1996; Newton 1999; Stolle and Rochon 1999;  Uslaner 1999; Stolle 
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2001). The critics question whether decline in face-to-face interactions in 
civil society is really the main driver behind the decline in trust in the US. 
I am also sceptical about explaining the decline in trust levels in the US by 
the increased tendency to ‘bowl alone’ (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the 
increase in social trust in Sweden and Denmark cannot be explained by an 
increase in civic engagement. Nevertheless—as will be argued in Chapter 
11—I do believe that face-to-face interaction in civil society matters for trust 
levels. But rather than its being the main driver of trust, I argue that face-to-
face interaction might be an important way to modify the social erosion 
caused by social inequality. 
 Putnam himself is open to the idea that economic inequality might be an 
important explanation for the decline in trust in the US. In ‘Bowling Alone’ 
he observed that 
 . . . social capital and economic inequality moved in tandem through most of the 
twentieth century. In terms of the distribution of wealth and income, America 
in the 1950s and 1960s was more egalitarian than it had been in more than a 
century . . . Record highs in equality and in social capital coincided. In both cases 
circumstantial evidence points to the World War II epoch as key. . . . Conversely, 
the last third of the twentieth century was a time of growing inequality and erod-
ing social capital . . . The timing of the two trends is striking: somewhere around 
1965–70 America reversed course and started becoming both less just economi-
cally and less well connected socially and politically. (Putnam 2000: 359) 
 However, inequality and poverty have no prominent place in Putnam’s 
writings. Though I believe in effects from social inequality, I fi nd it fair and 
understandable that Putnam and other scholars have hesitated to explain 
decline in trust with increased inequality. The problem is that—despite 
strong correlations between these trends—we are in need of a convincing 
micro-level theory that creates the theoretical link between the two variables. 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to establish such a theoretical link. 
 Finally, my book will also provide an alternative to the recent litera-
ture that links ethnic heterogeneity and trust (e.g. Alsina and Ferrara 2002, 
Putnam 2007). While I do believe that ethnic heterogeneity in the short 
run often lowers trust and is a severe challenge for Western societies, I do 
not believe that trends in ethnic heterogeneity have the ability to explain 
the trends described above. By comparative standards the US has always 
been ethnically heterogeneous, as has the UK from the second half of the 
20th century, and both Sweden and Denmark have experienced a tremen-
dous increase in ethnic heterogeneity within the last three decades. In 
Denmark immigrants and their children (with both parents foreign born) 
made up only 3.1 per cent of the population in 1980, and the majority of 
these groups came from neighbouring countries like Germany, Sweden, 
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and Norway. The only sizeable non-Western minority were the Turkish, 
who were welcomed as guest workers in the economic boom of the 1960s. 
By 2009, adult immigrants and their children made up 10.6 per cent of the 
Danish population, with non-Westerners accounting for 67 per cent of all 
immigrants in the country. This great increase was largely caused by refu-
gees seeking asylum, and family reunifi cations. This development has been 
even more dramatic in Sweden: in 1960, 4 per cent of Swedes were foreign 
born, but by 1980 the share was 7.5 per cent, and in 2008 it had increased 
to 13.8 per cent (Statistics Sweden). If one includes immigrants’ children, 
then the share increases to 16.7 per cent of the Swedish population in 
2006 (Djuve and Kavli 2007: 16). As in Denmark, the increase is primarily 
due to refugees and family unifi cation. Thus, while in the US and the UK 
decline in trust might go together with increased ethnic heterogeneity, the 
opposite seems to be the case in Sweden and Denmark. So if there is a link 
between ethnic heterogeneity and trust, developments in these countries 
seem to indicate that it is a contingent relationship. 
 1.5  The historical similarities and the logic of comparison 
 This book will use the four cases—US, UK, Sweden, and Denmark—to locate 
the mechanisms which have the capacity to change the level of social cohe-
sion. The comparative design helps to falsify some explanations such as the 
impact of ethnic diversity, and to verify other explanations. The premise of 
this design is that the same mechanisms operate (though in different direc-
tions) in the four countries. This premise could be questioned if the US, UK, 
Sweden, and Denmark were believed to constitute fundamentally different 
worlds. However, in this section it will be argued that Esping-Andersen’s 
social democratic and liberal welfare regimes are not mutual opposites. On 
the contrary, they have a great deal in common. 
 Historically these institutional confi gurations originate from a common 
point of departure and, ideologically, they continued to be based on a dream 
about creating an egalitarian, middle-class society. That can be illustrated by 
looking at contemporary citizens’ perceptions of what makes an ideal society. 
This is done by means of survey data from the US for 2010 (GSS) and from 
the UK (BSA), Sweden (ISSP), and Denmark (ISSP) for 2009 (see data introduc-
tion below). In all four countries the respondents were shown an illustration 
(including a small text, see Table 1.2) of different types of societies and then 
asked ‘What do you think the UK (respectively: US, Sweden, Denmark) ought 
to be like—which would you prefer?’ The distribution of responses is shown 
in Table 1.2. 
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 The striking fi nding is that Britons, Swedes, Danes, and even Americans had 
very similar perceptions of how their society ought to be. In all four countries, 
the most common answer was the type-D-shaped society  accompanied by the 
text ‘a society with most people in the middle’: 49 per cent of Americans, 60 
per cent of Britons, 52 per cent of Swedes, and 60 per cent of Danes preferred 
this society. The same preference can be found in most other countries which 
conducted the survey. Furthermore, most of those who did not choose the 
middle-class society pointed to the type-E society, which was accompanied by 
the text ‘many people near the top, and only a few near the bottom’: 26 per 
cent of Americans, 15 per cent of Britons, 32 per cent of Swedes, and 30 per 
cent of Danes chose this society. Actually it is quite telling that more respond-
ents picked type D, the middle-class society, than type E, which one could call 
an ‘everybody-a-winner’ society. The middle-class society still seems to be the 
utopian ideal in all four countries—the US included. The same is  also found 
by Norton and Ariely (2011) who in surveys asked Americans to construct 
the optimal income distribution. It turned out that the (average) constructed 
desired distribution came very close to actual income distribution in Sweden. 
 As for the rest of the respondents (those who did not pick type D or E), most 
picked type C society with the text ‘a pyramid with just a few people at the 
bottom’: 13 per cent used this category in the US, 17 per cent in UK, 12 per 
cent in Sweden, and 8 per cent in Denmark. The classic ‘conservative’ type-B 
 Table 1.2.  Public perceptions of an ideal society: US 2010, UK, Sweden, and Denmark 
2009 
 Type A 
 A small elite at 
the top, very 
few people 
in the middle 
and the 
great mass of 
people at the 
bottom 
 Type B 
 A society like 
a pyramid 
with a small 
elite at the 
top, more 
people in 
the middle, 
and most at 
the bottom 
 Type C 
 A pyramid 
except 
that just 
a few 
people 
are at the 
bottom 
 Type D 
 A society 
with most 
people 
in the 
middle. 
 Type E 
 Many 
people 
near the 
top, and 
only a few 
near the 
bottom. 
N (100%)
Ideal society:
US 3 9 13 49 26 1143
UK 1 7 17 60 15 1825
SE 1 3 12 52 32 1053
DK 0 2 8 60 30 1410
 Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers excluded. 
 Source: USA GSS 2000, UK BSA 2009, DK ISSP 2009, SW ISSP 2009. 
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society (with the text ‘a society like a pyramid with a small elite at the top, 
more people in the middle, and most at the bottom’) gained even less sup-
port. Finally, almost nobody was attracted by the type-A society with the text 
‘a small elite at the top, very few people in the middle, and the great mass of 
people at the bottom’. The American dream was not at all about establish-
ing the classically polarized, ‘early-capitalist’ type-A society, but rather the 
type-D, middle-class society—as in Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. 
 That Americans, Britons, Swedes, and Danes had and still have the same 
hopes and dreams for their society increases the relevance of a comparative 
study. If one believes that Americans and Britons simply have a passion for 
inequality, and Swedes and Danes a passion for equality, this similarity in 
perceptions of the ideal society might come as a surprise. However, seen in a 
historical perspective these four countries are not as different as often imag-
ined. In fact they have a lot in common, and the similarities ease the search 
for the factors that might explain why they end up with such different out-
come in terms of horizontal trust and public support for anti-poverty policies; 
it brings the study closer to a ‘most-similar design’. 
 To start with, they have Protestantism in common, whereby historically 
almost all Americans, Britons, Swedes, and Danes came to believe that religion 
was a relationship between the individual and God—without the involvement 
of hierarchical religious institutions. It is well known that these religious per-
ceptions heavily infl uenced the broader thinking of society. Protestantism pro-
motes the idea of enlightened, free individuals who are able to make their own 
decisions and should not be suppressed in this behaviour. This made a strong 
argument for individualism, equality, and democracy. 2 The strong emphasis on 
equality traced back to Protestantism can easily be found in the four countries. 
Citizens are believed to be born equal and not as members of certain strata. And 
if members are in fact born into certain strata (as in all societies), it is perceived 
to be a problem. This deep appreciation of equality is shared by liberalism and 
socialism, both of which developed in opposition to conservative rulers. 
 This profound similarity in basic egalitarian values is often overlooked 
because of different views on the equality of outcome: social democratic think-
ing favors redistribution; liberal thinking does not. However, in both cases 
the attitude towards redistribution is rooted in the basic value of equality of 
 2  Protestantism also fi ts very nicely with capitalism—according to Weber the former was the 
very foundation of the latter. Thus it was the uncertainty about whether one would end up in 
heaven or hell that made Protestants look for earthly signs such as wealth, and made them live a 
puritanical life that allowed the accumulation of capital. This impact of Protestantism is very well 
described for the case of America, where it became very sectarian and most people still believe in 
God. However, despite the fact that most Britons, Swedes, and Danes state that they do not believe 
in any God, it is clear that Protestantism has had a big impact. If one takes Weber’s old measure 
of the work ethic it is telling that, as measured by the ISSP survey of 1997, the world record in 
‘non-fi nancial work commitment’ is held by the Danes—not the Americans (Larsen 2003). 
01_Larsen_Ch01.indd   20 5/25/2013   2:34:04 AM
The Rise and Fall of Social Cohesion
21
opportunity. Thus in social democratic welfare regimes redistribution is typi-
cally advocated because people do not have the same opportunities to start 
out with. And there is a lack of redistribution in liberal welfare regimes because 
the market—it is thought—provides equal opportunities. Furthermore, even 
if we measure public perceptions of just wage differences (probably the most 
valid equality of outcome measure we have), it has been shown that wage 
differences between the liberal welfare regimes and social democratic welfare 
regimes are not as large as widely believed; actually it is the median voters in 
conservative welfare regimes who accept the greatest wage differences. The 
(median) French stated, for example, in the ISSP 1999 survey that high profes-
sions ought to earn a little above four times as much as a skilled factory worker. 
The British and the Americans believed that the difference should be a little 
above three times as much. The Danes answered two and half times as much 
and fi nally the Swedes answered twice as much (see Larsen 2006: 40). 
 In terms of policy, the shared value of equality of opportunity can be seen, 
for example, in the efforts all four countries have made to open the educational 
system to all citizens. Even the Americans, often believed to be reluctant to 
build big government, long ago established free public primary, secondary, and 
high schools. Furthermore the large number of US scholarships are believed 
to open the university system to all. Sweden and Denmark took this even fur-
ther and established free public universities and even introduced a generous 
universal student allowance. The basic idea—or at least the basic legitimation 
for these policies—is that everybody should have equal opportunities from the 
start. The liberal touch in Scandinavian welfare policies is actually well docu-
mented. Though Esping-Andersen labelled these countries social democratic 
regimes, it is a fact that in many cases the liberal agrarian parties implemented 
the characteristically Scandinavian universal benefi t schemes (Baldwin 1990). 
 Historically the US, UK, Denmark, and Sweden shared the same point of 
departure: tax-fi nanced benefi ts targeted at the (deserving) poor. Furthermore, 
the dimensions of the ‘golden-age’ welfare state were smaller than often 
imagined. In 1960, total public expenditures were 27 per cent of GDP in the 
US, 32 per cent in the UK, 31 per cent in Sweden, and 25 per cent in Denmark 
(Andersen 1998 : 116). This is naturally a very rough measure, and the high 
US military expenses to some extent hide its position as a welfare laggard. But 
in size, the British, Swedish, and Danish welfare states at least were not very 
different from each other. 3 
 The absence of any successful (real) socialist parties is another thing that 
the US, UK, Sweden, and Denmark have in common. This absence might be 
 3  Social expenditures are naturally a better measure, but they cannot be calculated very far 
back in history. Even the subtraction of military expenses makes it diffi cult to trace the real social 
expenditures in the old national accounts, which are the basis of the OECD fi gures. 
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caused by the absence of real conservatism, at least if one is to believe the 
work of Lipset (1997), 4 who argues that it is experience with feudal structures 
that generates class awareness and potential for socialism. He uses this line of 
reasoning to explain the absence of socialism in the US, and to explain why 
real socialism only succeeds in societies with a history of feudalism. The social 
democratic parties in the UK, Denmark, and Sweden were naturally heavily 
inspired by socialist thinking and based on the mobilization of workers. But 
in contrast to the socialist parties of continental Europe, they changed rather 
early from being workers’ parties (fi ghting for the narrow interests of their 
members) to ‘catch-all’ parties which strove to fi nd a national compromise 
between labour and capital. The result is not a fundamental absence of class 
awareness, as is noticeable at times in the US. But it is a fact that successful 
social democratism tends to crowd out the radical class awareness necessary 
for real socialism. It was actually the core of Marshall’s idea of full citizenship 
that the civil, political, and social rights provided by the state could ease the 
confl icts connected with capitalism (Marshall 1950). And it is a classic line 
of reasoning within socialist theory that the nation state (and especially the 
welfare state) was a way to stabilize capitalism and prevent revolution. 
 The essential point is that, when it comes to fundamental values and the 
historical point of departure after the Second World War, these four countries 
actually have a lot in common. It is only within the last three or four decades 
that these countries have grown apart. Therefore it may not be so surpris-
ing that both the liberal and social democratic welfare regimes had similarly 
high levels of trust during the ‘golden age’. It is a classic empirical fi nding 
that Protestantism is linked to higher levels of trust (e.g. Inglehart 1999). But 
more importantly for my theoretical argument, the (perceived) level of eco-
nomic equality was fairly equal in the four countries studied (see Chapters 3 
and 4). The ‘American melting pot’ is most often associated with the famous 
idea (or dream) that even the poorest immigrant people from whatever cul-
tural background can turn into well-off middle-class Americans through hard 
work (e.g. Glazer and Moynihan 1963). In the 1950s this dream seemed to 
have been largely fulfi lled. Lipset (1997) argues that Americans in the 1950s 
and 1960s came to believe that they had established the egalitarian society 
promised by socialism. The UK also had its idea of a melting pot where poor 
people, including immigrants from other Commonwealth countries, could 
be successfully integrated into the middle classes of the ‘mother country’. 
 4  The US, Sweden, and Denmark have never had strong forces that opposed the process of mod-
ernization. In the American case, it was quite obviously a matter of the absence of feudal struc-
tures. In the Swedes’ and Danes’ case, it was a matter of weak feudal structure due in part to a 
strong king. Thus, in many aspects the small independent farmers in Scandinavia created a point 
of departure that had much in common with that of a settler society. British conservatism was 
stronger, but it never resembled the conservatism found in continental Europe. 
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Sweden also prospered from the 1950s onwards, while the economic boom 
came a little later in Denmark (see Chapter 2). However, to ordinary people 
the most important symbol of a new, all-encompassing middle-class society 
was probably the capability of working-class people to establish nuclear fami-
lies in suburban areas. This was the symbol of the realization of the dream. 
 It was naturally contested whether the economic boom by itself could deliver 
a middle-class society with equality; the strong belief in the power of the mar-
ket to do this is probably an American peculiarity. However, in case the market 
should fail to do this, one can fi nd in all four countries progressive political 
projects that helped facilitate the coming of the new encompassing middle-class 
society; even in the American case. Kennedy entered offi ce with idea of a ‘New 
Frontier’, which marked a coming fi ght against poverty. The Johnson adminis-
tration followed the rhetoric and declared ‘war on poverty’ in 1964 in order to 
build the ‘Great Society’. Steensland (200 8) describes how plans to introduce a 
guaranteed income in the US actually received broad bipartisan support in the 
1960s (though it ultimately failed). In the other three countries, it was the social 
democrats who formulated the political projects aimed at fulfi lling the hopes 
for a middle-class society. In Sweden the social democrats labelled the project 
the ‘people’s home’; in Denmark, the social democrats proclaimed ‘Denmark 
for the people’, and in the UK the social democrats aimed to implement the 
famous ‘Beveridge plan’, which had become (and still is) a national symbol 
expressing British dreams of an all-encompassing society. Why the prospect of 
a prosperous middle-class society is believed to be of great importance for trust 
in fellow citizens will be further theorized in Chapter 4. 
 1.6  The data material behind this book 
 It is not an easy task to cover a 60-year period in four countries. If the research 
standard is to provide solid empirical evidence on the context, trust levels, and 
public attitudes in each country, it is in fact an impossible task. Still, the intended 
contribution of this book is to at least provide a theoretical answer to research 
questions about trends in trust and public support for ‘integrative policies’. 
This theoretical argument will then be illustrated by means of empirical data. 
Sometimes this will be in the form of general country descriptions. These descrip-
tions are possible because international organizations have compiled historical 
data on poverty, inequality, crime, family break-up, and other factors in the four 
countries. Most of these descriptions of the ‘real’ reality are based on fi gures from 
the OECD (oecd.stat.org) and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Both organi-
zations try to make US fi gures compatible with European fi gures. On other issues 
the theoretical points will be illustrated by empirical evidence which has been 
exclusively collected for this book. This includes survey questions posed in the 
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UK, Sweden, and Denmark, and a media-content study. Both data collections try 
to measure the ‘social constructions’ that can be found in each of the four coun-
tries. I will briefl y introduce both these unique data sources. 
 1.6.1  Measuring public opinion by means of unique survey material 
 The American General Social Survey (GSS) is the most widely-used data source 
for analysing the trust levels and public attitudes towards anti-poverty policy 
in the US. First conducted in 1972, many of the items have been repeated 
in following years. Of special relevance is the GSS 2000, as it included the 
ISSP module on social inequality, and a module labelled ‘Multi-ethnic United 
States’. The GSS 2010 is also of special relevance because it included the new-
est ISSP module on social inequality. Findings from these surveys have already 
been used above. The GSS is conducted as a face-to-face survey, but the ISSP 
items are in an attached self-completion section. The answers given in this 
large representative sample of the adult US population serve as a baseline for 
many of the analyses that will be conducted in this book. The question about 
social trust has been replicated in British, Swedish, and Danish surveys, but 
unfortunately the vast majority of other central GSS items cannot be found 
in European countries. This constitutes a fundamental research barrier if one 
wants to compare American and European public attitudes. 
 To overcome this barrier, this book is based on a unique data set in which 
a number of the most central GSS items have been replicated in the UK, 
Sweden, and Denmark. In the UK the relevant GSS items were included in the 
BSA 2009. The BSA is the most comprehensive British survey and provides 
a representative sample of the adult British population. As in the GSS, BSA 
data was collected in a face-to-face survey with a self-completion section that 
included the ISSP and a number of other items. In Denmark and Sweden the 
GSS items were included in the ISSP 2009 survey which in both countries 
was conducted as an independent postal survey of a representative sample 
of adults (the response rate was 59 per cent in Sweden and 56 per cent in 
Denmark; see the ISSP archive for details). In all four countries the survey 
institutes reported that no severe bias was found in the samples. Thereby I 
have tried to establish a truly comparative dataset, which is a unique tool 
for beginning to answer the research questions I have posed above. Finally, I 
should mention that this book also makes use of other national public opin-
ion surveys. 
 1.6.2  Measuring stereotypes by means of media pictures 
 It will be argued in this book that both our trust in fellow citizens and our 
willingness to support anti-poverty policies is dependent on our perception 
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of the persons at the ‘bottom’ of society. In Chapters 2 and 6, I argue that 
these perceptions are likely to be infl uenced by stereotypes, and that, though 
such ‘pictures in our heads’ are diffi cult to study, the pictures of the bottom 
in magazines and newspapers are an excellent way to describe the stereotypes 
present in different societies. The idea behind this design and the data col-
lection that followed were strongly inspired by Martin Gilens’s work on the 
American case (Gilens 1996b, 2000). He has studied how the bottom was por-
trayed in pictures in US news magazines during the period 1950–1992 (2000), 
with special emphasis on the fi ve-year period 1988–1992. Weekly news maga-
zines not being as common in Europe as in the US, I replicated Gilens’s work 
by analysing pictures in fi ve nation-wide newspapers in the UK, Sweden, and 
Denmark. For each of the three countries, I and a research assistant sampled 
1,750 newspapers. The pictures of the bottom and the accompanying sto-
ries found in these newspapers were coded and analysed (see Chapter 7 for 
details). The media content was gathered from the fi ve-year period prior to 
the survey described above. I thereby had a unique opportunity to study the 
link between stereotypes, media content and public attitudes (see Chapter 6 
for further introduction). 
 Just to give the reader a feeling for the collected media content, one of the 
articles from the sample is shown below (see Figure 1.2). The story and the 
attached pictures are from  The Sunday Telegraph (18 February 2007 ). The large 
picture on the left-hand side is of 15-year-old Billy Cox, who was gunned 
down in his bedroom in South London. The picture is followed by the text 
‘Target Tributes to Billy Cox, murdered in south London last week. Apparently 
he was not a member of a gang, which may have left him exposed’. The large 
picture on the right-hand side is an anonymous gunman for whom no name 
or age is stated. The picture is followed by the text ‘Gun menace behind the 
high-profi le murders. Life on the south London estates is a matter-of-fact 
story of daily violence and injury’. The unique stories in this media content 
are naturally of interest and provide a context for this book. However, like 
most other social scientists, I am not interested in peculiarities. The main 
ambition of the media study is to infer how the bottom in general is pre-
sented to ‘the majority’. This can be done by quantitative means: for each 
country it can be investigated how many stories are about crime, how many 
about pensioner poverty, and so on; how many times non-whites, and how 
many times whites are depicted. This can also be done by qualitative means. 
Thus, the person in a given picture can be seen as a representation of a stere-
otype. In Chapter 6 it will be argued that pictures such as those appearing in 
 The Sunday Telegraph are not simply random snap-shots of reality. In fact, they 
are social constructions, which both refl ect and infl uence our understanding 
of ‘the bottom’. The two pictures in Figure 1.2, below were selected by the 
newspaper from a large pool of pictures and the way the story is ‘framed’ is 
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also chosen. In this case, the right-hand picture was probably staged by the 
photographer. It is highly unlikely that the journalist and the photographer 
during their visit in Fenwick Estate in South London passed a person who 
pointed a gun into their camera (had that happened, it would surely have 
been described in the article). Thus, most likely the photographer found or 
created a person that fi t his or her (and the supposed readers’) image of what 
the killer of Billy Cox may have looked like. This person has been equipped 
with a gun, shirt, balaclava, and—with an attitude. These processes of the 
selection and sometimes even creation of media pictures contain valuable 
information, which this book will try to exploit. 
 1.6.3  Experimental data 
 Finally, this book is based on experimental data collected in 2009 and 2010. 
The experiment exposed the participant to different ‘treatments’ which tried 
to ‘load’ stereotypes. Afterwards the participants were asked about their level of 
trust, their support for anti-poverty policies, etc. The data is used in Chapter 11 
in a discussion of the possibility of deconstructing out-group perceptions. The 
setup of the experiment is also introduced in Chapter 11. 
 1.7  Outline of the book 
 This book is divided into four parts. The main structure of this book and 
overall line of reasoning are outlined in Figure 1.3. Part 1, ‘The Rise and Fall of 
Middle-Class Society’, describes how a number of changes in socio-economic 
structures challenged people’s perception of living in a middle-class society. 
The focus will be on deindustrialization, the break-up of family structures and 
immigration (Chapter 2). Part I will also describe how these socio-economic 
changes had very different consequences for the US and UK on the one hand, 
and for Sweden and Denmark on the other. This is a classic story about how 
the transition from an industrial to post-industrial economy was contingent 
upon political power resources and institutional legacies. 
 Part II of this book, ‘The Importance of Perceptions’, describes how our 
perceptions of the structures of our society infl uence our assessment of the 
trustworthiness of fellow citizens. Our perceptions of society are infl uenced 
by the actual structures of society. But this part of the book will demonstrate 
that this is not a simple one-to-one relationship. There are clear examples of a 
severe mismatch between ‘reality’ and perceptions. This leads to Part III, ‘The 
Construction of Perceptions: The Case of “the bottom”’, which—by means of 
media content—describes how ‘the poor’ are constructed in the four coun-
tries. The idea is that the mass media are the crucial link between the real 
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socio-economic structures and our perceptions of society. The mass media 
constructions are surely infl uenced by real socio-economic conditions. But it 
will be shown that this is again not a one-to-one relationship. In some areas 
there is a very clear deviance between ‘reality’ and the constructions of the 
mass media. These three parts of the book try to provide the answer as to 
why social cohesion declined in the US and UK and increased in Sweden and 
Denmark. In the last part of the book, Part IV, ‘The Contemporary Challenges: 
Vicious and Virtuous Feedback Circles’, I discuss whether the US and UK are 
caught in a stable, low-trust equilibrium, and Sweden and Denmark, in a sta-
ble, high-trust equilibrium. In making these assessments, this book discusses 
the importance of public opinion, the impact of increased ethnic diversity, 
and the countries’ ability to dismantle negative out-group perceptions. 
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and living 
conditions
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bottom”
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to social 
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 Figure 1.3.  The main line of causal reasoning explaining decreased trust levels in the 
US and UK and increased trust levels in Sweden and Denmark 
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